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Abstract 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the UK Accounting 
Standards Board (ASB) have adopted different financial reporting rules for different 
classes of company. The IASB have issued IFRS for Small and Medium-sized 
Entities (SMEs) in addition to full International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS); in the UK, currently companies follow IFRS (for public companies), UK 
GAAP (for medium-sized companies) or FRSSE (for small companies). It is difficult 
to evaluate the efficacy of this approach to regulation since the ASB (and IASB) are 
not clear as to what consequences should follow. Is the more extensive regulation for 
public companies expected to result in higher accounting quality than medium and 
small companies; or is it necessary to combat the increased opportunity and 
incentive for earnings management in public companies, so that there is the same 
accounting quality across the different groups of companies? 
The main objective of this study is to undertake a preliminary investigation of 
cash flow to earnings ratios as a measure of accounting quality in order to inform the 
future policy and discussion about the differential reporting framework. 
We find that the financial reporting behaviour of medium sized entities is 
significantly different from public and small companies. This suggests that 





1.1 A three tier system of financial reporting 
In 2009, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued a new 
set of accounting standards – IFRS for Small and Medium-sized Entities (SMEs) to 
exist alongside full IFRS. The IASB suggests that IFRS for SMEs are general-
purpose accounting standards regardless of size, and leave each jurisdiction to decide 
the size criteria to follow IFRS for SMEs. Following the IASB’s move, in 2012 the 
UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB) proposed in Financial Reporting Exposure 
Draft (FRED) 48, that there should be a three-tier system of financial reporting. 
FRED 48 proposes that medium-sized companies should follow Financial Reporting 
Standards 102, which is based on IFRS for SMEs; public listed should continue to 
follow full IFRS and small companies should continue to follow the FRSSE 
(Financial Reporting Standards for Smaller Entities). 
1.2 Consequences for accounting quality 
But what will happen to accounting quality across the different classes of 
company as a result of these differential reporting standards? Will accounting 
statements be comparable across the different classes of company? One justification 
for the system is that agency issues and complexity vary across the three tiers and 
that accounting regulations should therefore reflect this. Different regulations are 
required to deal with the fact that where there is separation of ownership from 
control, tighter regulation may be required to constrain opportunistic reporting 
behaviour by managers. In such a setting, the objective of the regulation system 
would seem to be to equalise accounting quality across the classes of company. This 
consequence seems to be implied by ASB (2012, p16). 
Another view is that differential regulation arises from the differential ability 
of companies to shoulder the cost burden of reporting and the differential needs of 
users and their ability to obtain information from the company outside of the annual 
reporting cycle to shareholders. In this case, it would seem that the quality of 
reporting may differ across companies. Such a consequence seems to be implied in 
IASB (2009, BC47). 
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The lack of clarity from both the ASB and the IASB as to the consequences of 
their regulatory stances is to be expected. Watts and Zimmerman (1979) argue that 
process of developing new accounting standards is a political one, a process of 
negotiation because regulators do not have enough understanding of how companies 
are going to respond. More recently, Young (2003) suggests that regulators are 
seemly passive, since they act as diplomats in aligning the differing needs of 
companies and users. They are specific only in so far it is necessary for the parties to 
agree, for example by engaging in rhetorical strategies to persuade users that 
standards are appropriate, correct and useful. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
important issue of what consequences will follow from differential regulation is not 
discussed explicitly by the IASB and ASB.  
1.3 Contribution 
In order to understand the potential impact of FRED 48, we compare 
accounting quality across existing boundaries, that of IFRS, UK GAAP, and FRSSE. 
The purpose of this is to inform discussion about the suitability of existing 
boundaries between groups (public listed, medium-sized and small companies). We 
propose no formal criteria for the desired differences between each group of 
companies.  
We use a sample of UK public, medium-sized and small companies in the 
period of 2010 and examine firms’ behaviour cross-sectionally based on the 
industrial classification in the UK. The reason why we choose this year is that 
companies are aware that differential reporting standards for SMEs are proposed by 
IASB. It is interesting to analyse how different groups of companies behave during 
this period in order to inform the future policy.  
1.4 Method and findings 
We measure accounting quality based on the relation between the most 
fundamental measure of firms’ performance, cash flows and earnings. Accounting 
quality is linked with how a firms’ cash flows have been transformed into reported 
earnings, so as to improve the information content of earnings. Accruals play a 
crucial role in the transforming process, because cash flows encounter timing and 
matching issues, which do not adequately reflect a firms’ underlying financial 
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performance. Hence, accounting quality is very much related to whether accruals are 
being correctly used to transform cash flows into informative reported earnings. The 
purpose of using this method is to identify whether there is any variation in 
accounting quality across different groups of companies based on their fundamental 
performance under current differential reporting framework. 
We begin by comparing the distribution of the cash flow to earnings ratio for 
three groups of companies. We find that the distribution of the ratio for medium-
sized companies is different from large and small companies. In contrast, when 
earnings are positive, large and small companies have a greater proportion of 
companies with extreme level of accruals than medium-sized companies. When 
earnings are negative, medium-sized companies have a greater proportion of 
companies with extreme level of accruals than large and small companies. 
We next compare the cash flows to earnings ratio across the groups by 
industry. We find that medium-sized companies have the highest level of accruals 
compare with large and small companies. Furthermore, medium-sized companies 
have the largest variations in accounting quality within its own group as well as 
across industries. We contribute to the literature on differential reporting 
requirements for different classes of company in the UK (listed, medium, and small) 
as proposed in FRED 48. First, we raise the issue of whether or not the requirement 
should lead to variation in the quality of reporting across the groups. Secondly, our 
preliminary analysis suggests that the accounting quality of medium sized companies 
may be different from listed and small companies. 
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: the literature review 
of development of differential reporting and accounting quality are discussed in next 
section; followed by the potential issues in section 3; sample and data is discussed in 
section 4; methodology of measuring accounting quality is provided in section 5; 
results and analysis are discussed in section 6; and conclusion are provided in the 




2. Literature Review 
2.1 Development of Differential Reporting 
The history of differential reporting began in the early 1980s, prior to the 
Companies Act 1981 in the UK, when companies were governed by identical 
financial reporting and disclosure requirements, regardless of size, industry or public 
interest (Collis and Jarvis, 2003). The issues of accounting standards and small 
companies were considered by the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) in 1983 
and a consultative meeting was held between the ASC and representatives of small 
businesses (Barker and Noonan, 1996).  
Meantime, in 1985, ICAEW sponsored a research project to establish whether 
there was a need for accounting standards for small companies. The researchers 
indicated that exemptions from standards with limited importance to small 
companies should be considered to reduce the burden of complying full accounting 
standards (Greeff, 2008). 
Abbreviated Accounts 
The abbreviated accounts for small companies are less detailed and need less 
information for public record. The abbreviated accounts of small company or limited 
liability partnership (LLP) do not have to report the profit and loss account or 
director's report that are normally required by Companies Act (Collis and Jarvis, 
2003). The Companies Act 1985 permitted small and medium size companies to file 
abbreviated accounts with the Registrar of Companies, although companies are 
required to furnish shareholders with the full set of accounts. The content of 
abbreviated accounts is relatively less than the full set of financial statements. For 
instance, companies are not required to file a profit and loss account or a directors’ 
report (Collis and Jarvis, 2003). However, directors would incur additional costs to 
produce abbreviated accounts, as it is an additional set of financial statements drawn 
from the full financial statements.  
Financial Reporting Standards for Smaller Entities (FRSSE) 
With the establishment of ASB in 1990, the style and content of accounting 
became longer and more complex. As a result, the relevance of the new standards to 
small companies became questionable, and representations were made to the ASB to 
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consider the position of small companies and to make appropriate provision for the 
application of standards to them (Barker & Noonan, 1996).  
In December 1995, the CCAB Working Party published a White Paper entitled 
“Designed to Fit”, while the main argument of this paper was that all accounting 
standards applicable to small companies should be issued in a single document 
(Barker and Noonan, 1996; ASB, 2007; Greeff, 2008). The ASB, accepted the 
CCAB Working Party’s recommendations, and became the second standard setter to 
implement differential reporting when it published an Exposure Draft (ED) of the 
proposed FRSSE in December 1996, which led to the issue of the FRSSE in 
November 1997 (ASB, 2007). FRSSE is applicable to all reporting entities that 
qualify as “small” under the Companies Act and its main aim is to reduce disclosure 
requirements of the full array of accounting standards. The FRSSE is lighter than the 
full set of standards by 50 disclosure requirements (Collis and Jarvis, 2003). 
IFRS for SMEs 
With the debate on whether SMEs should comply with full sets of accounting 
standards, the official differential reporting initiatives at the IASB started in 1998 
when the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) launched a SME 
project in April 1998 (IASB, 2003a). In December 2000, the IASC noted that there 
was a need for a different version of international accounting standards for SMEs to 
reduce the costs and burden of SMEs in complying with full IFRS, and highlighted 
this as a critical agenda item for the newly formed IASB. The IASB took note and 
launched a research project for SMEs in 2001 (Greeff, 2008). On 9 July 2009, the 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) designed for use by small and 
medium-sized entities (SMEs) was published by IASB. 
IFRS for SMEs is for those companies that do not have public accountability, 
regardless of size. The primary objective of the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) is to “establish a single set of high quality, understandable and 
enforceable global accounting standards that will enable transparent and comparable 




The IASB only put focus on users’ needs and cost-benefit analyses between 
full IFRS and IFRS for SMEs – “the nature and degree of the differences between 
full IFRS and an IFRS for SMEs must be determined on the basis of users’ needs 
and cost-benefit analyses.” However, the objective of IASB in differential reporting 
framework is unclear in terms of accounting quality. They do not specify what 
consequences or accounting quality should follow across each class of companies. 
Proposal of ASB in the UK 
In 2012, in line with IASB’s move, the UK Accounting Standard Board (ASB) 
proposed Financial Reporting Exposure Draft (FRED) 48, which is about the future 
of Financial Reporting in the UK and Republic of Ireland. It indicates that 
companies without public accountability will follow Financial Reporting Standards 
102 (FRS 102), which is based on IFRS for SMEs. The proposed financial reporting 
framework in the UK will be three classes of companies following different sets of 
accounting standards, include public listed companies will still follow full IFRS to 
prepare consolidated accounts; private non-small companies will follow the FRS 102 
(based on IFRS for SMEs); and private small companies will still follow Financial 
Reporting Standards for Smaller Entities (FRSSE). ASB defines each class of 
companies (public quoted, medium-sized and small companies) under size criteria of 
Companies Act 2006. 
However, different from IASB, the main objective of ASB’s move is to enable 
users of accounts to receive high-quality understandable financial reporting, “which 
is proportionate to the size and complexity of the entity and the users’ information 
needs, whilst maintaining the quality of financial reporting” (ASB, 2012a, pg.16).  
 
2.2 Factors Driving Differential Reporting Standards 
With the development of differential reporting framework, factors driven 
private companies to have different sets of accounting standards include users’ 
needs, agency issues, complexity, and costs.  
User’s needs 
Research in the UK and Ireland indicates that there is a difference between the 
main users of the financial statements of large companies and those of SMEs (Collis 
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and Jarvis, 2003). Large companies’ financial statements are widely circulated in the 
market and available to a wide range and unlimited number of users. The circulation 
of financial statements of SMEs, on the other hand, is generally restricted to 
shareholders. SMEs do not have a statutory requirement to report full accounts to 
Registrar of Companies if they fulfill certain size criteria, although they still have to 
report full accounts to furnish shareholders with full accounts. Investors, lenders, 
suppliers, customers and the general public market, therefore do not have automatic 
access to the financial statements of the typical SME (Greeff, 2008).  
It is also indicated, in the Statement of Principles (ASB, 1999), that large 
companies have a much broader range of users than small companies (Collis and 
Jarvis, 2003). As mentioned above, the typical users of financial statements prepared 
by private companies are its shareholders and banks, and the taxation authorities. It 
could, therefore be argued that not all accounting standards and reporting 
requirements contained in IFRS should be applicable to SMEs (Greeff, 2008). 
Agency Issues 
Ownership and management in large companies are separate, whereas for 
private companies, there is no separation of ownership between shareholders and 
directors. Conflicts of interest between corporate insiders, such as managers and 
controlling shareholders, on one hand, and outside investors, such as minority 
shareholders, on the other hand, are central to the analysis of the modern corporation 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Agency issues are exacerbated in public companies since they have complex 
transactions, which provide the scope for performance management. Generally, 
management of public companies are likely to manage earnings upwards, to show to 
investors that the company is doing well. As for SMEs, they may have agency 
problems within the owner/manager structure, but they likely to be less severe than 
in public companies. Overall, public companies need to be more closely regulated 
compared with private companies based on agency issues.  
Size and Complexity 
The main argument in differential reporting is that large companies have 
complex transactions, and therefore need more complex regulation to neutralise the 
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incentives for performance management. ASB (2012a, p9) regards size and 
complexity as a major objective affects the regulation. However, such complexities 
are rarely relevant in small companies. Private companies may have simpler 
transactions, and with less facility for performance management. Therefore, in terms 
of size and complexity, SMEs will demand less complex accounting rules compared 
with large companies.  
Costs 
Compliance with IFRS is costly. Companies have to either appoint additional 
staff in the finance department or rely on their auditors to ascertain compliance with 
the requirement of IFRS. It is generally acknowledged that the work effort and costs 
of complying with certain accounting standards is proportionately more burdensome 
and may be somewhat overwhelming for SMEs (Greeff, 2008). Small companies 
cannot afford the same quality of reporting as large companies. As well as having an 
influence on financial reporting requirements, this factor is the basis for the 
exemptions from audit given to small companies.  
In addition, fewer users of private companies are likely to reap the benefits of 
the information produced than is the case for publicly accountable enterprises. The 
increased costs as a result of the additional recognition and disclosure requirements, 
often add no value to the users (Greeff, 2008). Therefore, the issue of the cost will 
probably lead to the regulators to consider differential reporting in order to reduce 
the burden for small companies on complying with full IFRS. 
 
2.3 Role of Accounting Quality in Policy Making 
Accounting quality is referred as the term of earnings quality in accounting 
information. Accounting quality can be defined as the extent to which the financial 
statement information reflects the underlying economic situation. In particular, 
Dechow et al (2010 pg.344) define the earnings quality as “higher quality earnings 
provide more information about the features of firm’s financial performance that are 
relevant to a specific decision made by specific decision-maker”.  
Accounting quality is one way to measure firms’ financial performances and 
behavior, and accounting quality research is influencing standard setters and 
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regulators. For instance, a report on audit quality by the US Department of the 
Treasury (2008) references numerous accounting quality studies (e.g., Ogneva et al., 
2007; Myers et al., 2003). The Treasury Department in the US also publishes a 
commissioned study by an academic researcher that summarizes the accounting 
quality literature on restatements (i.e., Scholz, 2008). Further, the Congressional 
debates leading up to the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 cite several 
academic studies (e.g., DeFond et al., 2002). DeFond (2010) suggested there is 
ample evidence that accounting quality plays a role in the process of policy-making. 
For example, Treasury Department and the FASB have sought informal input 
directly from accounting academics regarding research studies that potentially 
inform proposed standards (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996; Hanlon et al., 2008). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1979) argue that academic accounting research is used 
in the “market for excuses” to buttress and justify standard setters’ preconceived 
notions. For example, Ramanna (2008) suggests that the decision to promulgate fair-
value accounting for goodwill was politically motivated, rather than the result of 
policy makers carefully evaluating and weighing the evidence in the academic 
literature. DeFond (2010) further argues that although regulators were aware of the 
accounting quality literature, it was unclear whether or how accounting quality 
research actually influences policy makers’ decisions because standard setters and 
lawmakers might selectively cite research in order to achieve political ends.  
DeFond (2010) suggests there is ample evidence that accounting quality plays 
a role in the process of policy-making and influences the standard setters and 
regulators in the process of policy-making. However, from the development of 
differential reporting framework, regulators (ASB and IASB) have mentioned 
neither how they consider accounting quality in the policy-making process nor what 
they expect SMEs in the future in terms of accounting quality. Regulators emphasize 
the development of differential reporting standards for SMEs is mainly to reduce the 
reporting burden and cost of SMEs (ASB 2012a; IASB 2009). However, it is 
difficult to predict what regulators expect because they have not made clear what 
they expect in the future in terms of behavior of SMEs such as what accounting 
quality they expect for SMEs since accounting quality is one way of measuring 
firms’ financial behavior. This is consistent with DeFond (2010), who suggested that 
it was unclear whether or how accounting quality research actually influences policy 
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makers’ decisions because standard setters and lawmakers might selectively cite 
research in order to achieve political ends. 
 
2.4 Accounting Quality for Public Companies and Private Companies 
Beatty, Ramesh and Weber (2002) and Beatty, Ke and Petroni (2002) find that 
public firms have a greater propensity to manage earnings than private firms; 
whereas Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006) report the opposite, they find that private 
companies (excluding small companies) in the EU have more earnings management 
than public companies.  
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) find that financial reporting in public companies 
is more informative than in private companies. They find that private companies 
(excluding small companies) in the UK have poorer loss recognition timeliness than 
public companies. This is the effect of the financial market demand. However, 
Givoly et al (2010), who provide no conclusion on which group of companies have 
better accounting quality, but suggested that accounting quality for public and 
private companies are driven by two effects: demand from the market for good 
accounting quality and incentives from managing earnings to deceive users. They 
find that US private equity companies (with public debt) have better quality than 
public equity companies. This is the effect of earnings opportunism. Interestingly, on 
loss recognition timeliness they find similar to Ball and Shivakumar (2005), that 
public equity companies report more conservatively than private equity companies. 
Findings in the literature regarding accounting quality for public and private 
companies are mixed, that public companies tend to report more conservatively 
because of higher demand and tough regulations whereas private companies have 
lower accruals quality because of less market demand and less legal enforcement. 
 
2.5 Criticism of the regulation process 
Accounting standards are firstly emerged in early 1930s in the US because 
companies are trying to manage earnings to report better financial performances than 
it actually was.  Furthermore, in the late1960s, there was a lot of public criticism of 
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financial reporting methods in the UK. Hence, accountings standards are in the 
position of disciplining companies to report good quality of earnings. However, with 
the development of accounting standards and differential reporting standards, the 
regulators have failed to mention how informative that they expect firms’ earnings to 
be.  
Ball (2001) mentions “you cannot regulate an economy very effectively if 
there are incentives in the economy to act against the way you regulate.” Therefore, 
Ball (2001) suggests that there is no point to have accounting standards if they are 
not properly enforced.  
Joni Young (2003) suggests that accounting standard boards regulate without 
any clear objectives, and therefore are engaged a variety of efforts to persuade users 
that the work of theirs is valuable, appropriate, useful and correct. Young (2003, 
pg.625) indicates that accounting standard boards employ rhetorical strategies in its 
accounting standards attempt to persuade users that a specific standard is “good”, 
that silence alternatives and possible criticisms of the standard and that construct the 
FASB as a “good” standard-setter. These strategies help to establish standards as 
technical products and thus work to maintain the myth of accounting objectivity 
(Young, 2003, pg.637). Further, standards and accounting practices are to be seen as 
emergent from a rational process that separates the technical and political rather than 
as the result of the needs of a particular agent or the demand of economic reality 
(Young, 2003, pg.637).  
Therefore, the process of developing new accounting standards is the process 
of negotiation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979; Young, 2003), because the regulators 
that regulators do not have enough understanding of what market and economy 
really desire, and the regulation process is the process of negotiation and lobbying in 






3. Potential Issues 
3.1 What do regulators expect? 
The objectives of having differential reporting standards include: the concern 
of size issues; cost issues; agency issues; and economic importance of companies. 
Further, these concerns are major factors driving accounting quality across different 
groups of companies to be different. Is differential reporting a response to the 
differential importance of companies and the differential cost of compliance? This 
approach would suggest that variation in accounting quality across companies is 
acceptable. Or is differential reporting a response to the differential complexity of 
transactions and the incentive to report truthfully and fairly? This approach would 
suggest that variation in accounting quality across companies is not acceptable.  
Situations in which variations in accounting quality are acceptable 
IASB (2009 page 18) proposed that “the differences between full IFRS and 
IFRS for SMEs must be determined on the basis of users’ needs and cost-benefit 
analyses.” If differential reporting is a response to differential importance of 
companies, users’ needs and the differential cost of compliance, the variations 
between each class of companies are acceptable. Public companies have more 
economic importance, hence, users from legal forces (accounting regulations and 
government) and market forces (investors, share-holders, and debt-holders) would 
have demanded more information from public companies. Public companies have 
made financial information publicly available, which give easy access to investors 
and shareholders. As for private companies, their equities are not publicly traded and 
they have less economic importance.  Hence, there is a smaller demand from the 
open market for private companies to have accounting quality as good as public 
companies. 
Compliance with IFRS is costly. Companies either have to appoint additional 
staff in the finance department or rely on their auditors to ascertain compliance with 
the requirement of IFRS. Small companies generally cannot afford the same quality 
of reporting as large companies. As well as having an influence on financial 
reporting requirements, this factor is the basis for exemptions from audit given to 
small companies. In addition, the increased costs as a result of the additional 
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recognition and disclosure requirements, often add no value to the users (Greeff, 
2008). 
Situations in which variations in accounting quality are not acceptable  
ASB (2012 page 16) proposed that “FRS for 102 is a proportionate solution 
written specifically for smaller and medium-sized entities whilst maintain the quality 
of financial reporting.” If differential reporting is a response to the differential 
complexity of transactions and the incentive to report truthfully and fairly, then the 
variations of accounting quality between each class of companies are not acceptable. 
Larger companies have more complex transactions, and hence they need more 
complex regulations to neutralise the incentives for performance management. As 
for smaller entities, such complexities are rarely relevant, which means they may 
have simpler transactions with less facility for performance management. Therefore, 
the variations in accounting quality between large and smaller entities are not 
acceptable. 
Due to agency issues, large companies have more incentives to manage 
earnings in order to hide or delay their poor financial performance, suggesting large 
companies need to be more regulated to prevent opportunistic earnings management. 
Smaller companies, on the other hand, do not suffer the agency problems and have 
fewer incentives to manage earnings, suggesting small companies do not need to be 
more closely regulated. Therefore, the outcome of accounting quality is expected to 
have less or no variations between large and smaller entities. 
Issues Arising 
IASB has not made clear of what they expect in terms of accounting quality, 
whereas ASB expects firms to have equalised accounting quality. Does differential 
reporting framework promote equalised accounting quality across different sizes of 
companies? 
What if the size criteria are not appropriate for companies that will be adopting 
the new standards (IFRS for SMEs), which in turn might result low quality of 
reporting? What if there are some large-private companies need to be regulated like 
public companies? What if there are some small companies need to be regulated like 
medium companies? What if the demand of reporting high quality of financial 
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information does not counteract the incentives of managing earnings in public 
companies and private companies?  
 
3.2 Research Question 
Therefore, the analysis of companies’ behavior of reporting their financial 
information under current regulatory structure is needed in order to inform the future 
regulation policy. We cannot examine the post-adoption effects of accounting quality 
because the new accounting standards for SMEs (FRS 102) are not yet adopted in 
the UK, and there are very few studies address these issues for SMEs. The main 
objective of this study is to examine the discipline of current differential accounting 
regulations on accounting quality in order to inform the discussion about the 
suitability of existing boundaries between the groups. That is, we compare the 
quality of financial reporting for public and private companies under current 
reporting framework in the UK. We propose no formal criteria for the desired 
differences between the groups, but merely make observations. 
 
Is there any variation in accounting quality for different groups of companies under 
differential reporting regimes? 






4. Sample and Data 
We investigate the accounting quality in public companies as well as in the 
SMEs under differential reporting regimes in the UK. Current structure of financial 
reporting regimes in the UK is as follows: public EU quoted companies are 
following full IFRS to prepare consolidated accounts, private non-small (medium) 
companies are following UK GAAP
1
 and small companies are following FRSSE.
2
   
The main data applied in this paper is obtained from the “Financial Analysis 
Made Easy” (FAME) database supplied by Bureau Van Dijk. The database provides 
financial statement information of public and private British companies. The 
database is updated monthly. When a firm converts from one type to another (private 
to public, for example), all its past information is classified in subsequent versions of 
FAME under the latest type.  
We therefore checked the firm type in older versions of the database for each 
year over the sample period, 2008-2010. The reason why we choose these years is 
that companies are aware that differential reporting standards for SMEs are proposed 
by IASB. It is interesting to analyse how different groups of companies behave 
during this period in order to inform the future policy. We examine firms’ behavior 
cross-sectionally based on industries classification in the UK.  
Changes in type were verified against the listing or delisting date from the 
London Share Price database and/or the date of last change of name in the FAME 
database (conversion from private to public requires a name change in the UK). The 
main advantage of the FAME database is that it includes privately held corporations, 
allowing us to focus on an economically important group of firms that is relatively 
under-represented in most of academic accounting research.  
We select public and private companies-observations that are active from years 
of 2008 to 2010. We exclude companies that are subsidiary as their reporting 
requirement is different. The criterion for the subsidiary in FAME is that the 
minimum path of the ultimate owner is 50.01%. We also screen out private firms 
                                                          
 
2
 There are still public companies following UK GAAP and private companies following IFRS, these 
companies are excluded in our studies, given our intuition of this research is to compare three classes 
companies that are public quoted companies following IFRS, medium companies following UK 
GAAP and small companies following FRSSE respectively.  
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whose legal form is not equal to the status of corporations such as legal forms like 
sole proprietorships or partnerships. We exclude banks, insurance companies and 
other financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6799). We also exclude companies that 
without known value of total assets in the years of 2008, 2009 and 2010 in order to 
mitigate the data errors.  
In the UK, sections 382 and 465 of the Companies Act 2006 define private 
companies as SMEs for the purpose of accounting requirements. According to this a 
small company is one that fulfill at least two criteria of following, which include (1) 
turnover of not more than £6.5 million, (2) a balance sheet total of not more than 
£3.26 million and (3) not more than 50 employees. A medium-sized company has to 
satisfy at two of following criteria: (1) a turnover of not more than £25.9 million, (2) 
a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and (3) not more than 250 
employees. Typically, we select active public companies for the years of 2008-2010, 
private medium companies with turnover greater than £6.5 million and balance sheet 
worth greater £3.26 million for the years of 2008-2010, and small companies with 
annual turnover of £6.5 million or less and have an annual balance sheet worth no 
more than £3.26 million for the years of 2008-2010.  
We therefore obtain the initial sample by dividing companies observations 
based on the size criteria from Companies Act into three groups of companies, which 
are large companies (public companies), medium companies (private medium-sized 
companies) and small companies.  
Current structure of financial reporting regimes in the UK requires public EU 
quoted companies following full IFRS to prepare consolidated accounts, private non-
small companies following UK GAAP and small companies following FRSSE. We 
then match the initial sample into corresponding Financial Reporting standards, 
which means we will have large companies-observations only following IFRS, 
medium companies-observations only following UK GAAP and small-companies 
observations only following FRSSE in the years. However, certain information for 
Small Companies observations may not be available in the database as Small 
Companies under Companies Act generally do not have to submit full audited 
accounts, they only need to submit abbreviated accounts, (no Profit & Loss account 
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and Cash flow statement).
3
  
Several previous studies computed earnings quality proxies based on group of 
firms, such as Leuz et al. (2003) and Barth et al. (2008) typically used country-level 
observations. To better control for firm characteristics and economic influences, we 
choose a finer partition for our three types of companies-observations based on the 
industry-level, which is from industry sectors classification in FAME. Companies-
















, Education & Health. 
Table 1 summarises the final sample for empirical testing with the number of 
companies and the number of companies distributed in 10 industries. Our sample 
comprises 46,146 UK companies for the observation-year of 2008-2010 available in 
the database of FAME. There are larger portions of companies distributed in 
Manufacturing, Wholesale, and Education & Health.    
 
 
                                                          
3
 They are exempted from statutory audit if companies qualify as small companies and with 
turnover of no more than £6.5 million and total assets of no more than £3.26 million. By 
having full exemption of statutory audit, there could be disadvantage. Banks, credit 
managers, customers and suppliers rely on information from Companies House to assess 
creditworthiness and will be reassured by an independent audit. 
4
 Primary sectors include agriculture, mining, and etc. 
5
 Manufacturing sector includes food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, wearing apparel, leather, 
wood, cork, paper, publishing, printing, chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic products, 
metals & metal products, machinery, equipment, furniture, and recycling. 
6
 Utility sector includes gas, water, and electricity. 
7
 Wholesale sector includes wholesale and retail trade. 
8
 Service sector includes hotels and restaurants. 
9
 Telecom sector includes post and telecommunication. 
10
 Other services sector includes other services, public administration and defence. 
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Industrial Distribution of Numbers of Large, Medium-sized and Small companies 
 
Industries Description
 Number of Large 
Companies 
Number of Medium 
Companies 
Number of Small 
Companies 




94 675 168 937 
2 Manufacturing
 
528 7494 367 8389 
3 Utility 29 273 37 339 
4 Construction 127 1975 1092 3194 
5 Wholesale  318 6438 1485 8241 
6 Service 55 1282 204 1541 
7 Transport 97 1731 320 2148 
8 Telecom 39 339 111 489 
9 Other services 37 1087 359 1483 
10 Education & Health 929 14302 4154 19385 
Total 
 
2253 35596 8297 46146 
 
This table displays the industry sectors’ distribution of the large, medium and small companies.  
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are those have 
turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, following with UK GAAP. Small companies 
are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees, following with FRESSE. 






Under accruals system, firms’ cash flows are transformed into reported 
earnings by accruals. Earnings are more informative about firms’ financial 
performances than cash flows (Dechow, 1994).  Accruals play a crucial role in the 
transforming process, because cash flows encounter timing and matching issues, 
which could not be the best measure for firms’ real financial performance. Hence, 
accruals are used in solving the timing and matching problems associated in cash 
flows, and transformed cash flows into reported earnings to better reflect firms’ 
actual financial performance.   
Assuming the accounting standards are properly enforced under regulated 
economy, that accounting quality or earnings quality is all about whether firms’ cash 
flows have been correctly transformed into reported earnings, which is deemed to be 
more informative about firms’ financial performances. Accruals are playing a crucial 
role in the transforming process, because cash flows encounter timing and matching 
issues, which could not be the best measure for firms’ real financial performance. 
Hence, accounting quality is very much related to whether accruals are being 
correctly used to transform cash flows into informative reported earnings.  
Therefore, in this study, we adopt the most fundamental rationales for 
measuring accounting quality for different groups of companies. The purpose of this 
is to obtain a preliminary view of how different groups of companies behave under 
current differential reporting framework.  
 
5.2 Cash flows to Earnings Analysis 
Cash flows could also be used to measure firm performance. However, over 
finite intervals, reporting cash flows is not necessarily informative. This is because 
cash flows have timing and matching problems that cause them to be a “noisy” 
measure of firm performance. Earnings are used as the summary measure of firm 
performance produced under the accrual basis of accounting by wide range of users 
(Dechow, 1994). However, earnings potentially suffer from a problem that cash 




may have incentives to manage earnings to smooth reported earnings, to boost stock 
price, to decrease income tax expense, to make firms look better, to maximize 
managers' compensation, or to decrease political visibility. Firms could use reporting 
discretion to mask or misstate economic performance and earnings could be 
temporarily inflated by accrual choices (Burgstahler et al., 2006). For example, firms 
can overstate reported earnings to achieve certain earning targets or report 
extraordinary performance in specific instances such as an equity issuance (Teoh et 
al., 1998).  
Basically, if earnings are persistent (or in high quality), the level of earnings 
will be continually recurring from accounting to accounting period. This type of 
measure are usually adopted for the research of usefulness of earnings to equity 
investors for valuation, with assumption that more persistent earnings will yield 
better inputs to equity valuation models, and hence a more persistent earnings 
number is of higher quality than a less persistent number (Dechow et al, 2010). 
Accruals are crucial component in earnings affecting earnings persistence. This tries 
to capture whether accruals are performing a useful function in making adjustments 
to cash flows. If accruals are too small then there seems to be little point because 
accruals do not perform its roles in compensating timing and matching problems of 
cash flows properly. If accruals are too large, then earnings might appear not to have 
any economic substance. The extreme large level of accruals involved in earnings is 
low quality because they represent a less persistent component of earnings. 
Therefore, appropriate magnitude of accruals in earnings is indicative of good 
earnings quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002 pg.54). 
Since we examine both public and private companies and stock prices are only 
available for quoted companies, we are unable to measure the performance of 
companies in terms of stock returns but instead we can examine the quality of their 
accounts based on firms’ earnings, cash flows and accruals. Therefore, we assume 
that cash flows are free of manipulation
11
 and analyse the accounting quality for each 
group of companies based on earnings relative to cash flows. In this study, we use 
cash flows from operation (CFO) to earnings (E) ratio to obtain the level of accruals. 
The purpose of this is to obtain the basic understanding of financial behaviour for 
                                                          
11
 Note further that we assume that cash flows are free of manipulation, although this is not always the 




each class of companies in order to compare the differences in their accounting 
quality. Ratio is applied into large (public listed companies), medium-sized and 
small companies respectively. 
Cash flows from operation to earnings (CFO/E) ratio 
Following the study of Dechow (1994), and taking note of no requirement of 
cash flow statement to be prepared by SMEs, hence, the cash flows from operations 
(CFO) are measured as follows: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂 = 𝐸 + 𝐷𝑒𝑝 − 𝛥𝑊𝐶 
where: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂 = Cash flow from operation for the year; 
𝐸 = Profit after tax and extraordinary items for the year; 
𝐷𝑒𝑝 = Depreciation for the year; 
𝛥𝑊𝐶 = Increase in Debtors + Increase in Stock – Increase in Creditors for the year. 
 
Therefore, the first measurement of firms’ performance related to earnings 
quality is: 





i = 1, …, 𝑛𝑔,𝑘; 
𝑔 = L (Large), M (Medium), S (Small); 
k = Industry 1, 2, … 10; 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑔,𝑘 = Cash flow from operation for company i in group 𝑔 and industry k; 





The ratio of CFO/E reflects both accounting characteristics and economic 
characteristics. The quality of earnings differs in different accounting frameworks as 
well as in different economic environments.  
 
Distributions of CFO/E  
In order to compare the accounting quality across three groups of companies, 
we firstly obtain the entire distribution of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 ratio. This approach allows us to 
understand how each group of companies is distributed entirely and how many 
companies have fallen out of the distribution.  
Firstly, we take the mean and ±2σ of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 as dividing point in the distribution, 
which means we will have a distribution with four regions (i.e. 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸




< mean, mean ≤ 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 ≤ 2σ, and 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 > 2σ). Secondly, we calculate the frequency of 
companies, which fall into each region for each group of companies. Thirdly, we 
convert the frequency number into percentage of number of each group. Companies 
have higher absolute value of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 suggest companies have higher level of accruals in 
earnings. Therefore, if companies’ 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 fall out the region of ±2σ, that may indicate 




 could be due to two situations, where positive cash flows with 
negative earnings and negative cash flows with positive earnings. Companies with 
positive cash flows and negative earnings have fewer tendencies to manage earnings. 
However, those companies with negative cash flows and positive earnings have 
more tendencies to manage earnings.  
Hence, each group of companies’ distribution will then be split into two groups 
of distributions – distribution for the positive earnings group and distribution for the 




revise the regions of the frequency distribution for positive and negative earnings 
group respectively. The regions for positive earnings group will be -2σ, 0, mean, 




The reason of constructing the distribution of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 ratio is to examine how 
differently those large, medium and small companies distributed. It is able to show 
the entire distribution for each group of companies so as to give us an overview of 
how each group of companies behave in terms of accounting quality. Furthermore, it 
is able to show how many proportions of companies with extreme level of accruals. 
 
Distributions of SMEs vs. Distribution of Large companies  
Previous method is used to analyse the distribution of three groups of 
companies based on their own means and standard deviation. In order to compare the 
three types of distributions, we then examine whether the observations in medium 
and small companies have come from the same distribution as large companies. The 
intuition is to test whether the observations in medium and small companies could 
have occurred in the distribution of large companies.  
Large companies follow full IFRS, which is more detailed accounting 
standards than UK GAAP and FRSSE. Under effects of accounting standards, we 
take the accounting quality as benchmark to compare with medium and small 
companies. That means we take the measure of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 for large companies as 
benchmark. Firstly, we take the mean and ±2σ of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 from large companies to set up 
different regions for comparisons with medium and small companies. That means we 
have a distribution with four regions with three dividing points: −2𝜎𝐿, 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐿, 
+2𝜎𝐿. Secondly, we calculate how many proportions of observations from each 
group of companies fall into each region in order to examine how observations in 
medium and small companies could have occurred in the distribution of large 
companies.  
For each group of companies, sample will again be split into two parts – 
distribution for positive earnings group and distribution for negative earnings group. 












earnings group will be −2𝜎𝐿, 0, 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐿, +2𝜎𝐿; and the regions for negative earnings 
group will be −2𝜎𝐿, 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐿, 0, +2𝜎𝐿. 
The advantage of this method is that allows us to compare how differently 
those SMEs behave from large companies. 
 




 within each industry for three groups of companies, by taking 
deviations from the average of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸




)𝑖,𝑔,𝑘  is the ratio of cash flow from operations to earnings for company i 
in group 𝑔 and industry k: 
where,  
i =1, ..., 𝑛𝑔,𝑘. 
𝑔 = L (large), M (medium), S (small). 
k =1,2...,10. 
The average ratio of cash flow from operations to earnings, for group 𝑔 
companies in industry 𝑘 is as follows:  






 / 𝑛𝑔,𝑘 
The deviation of the ratio of cash flow from operations to earnings for 












Ratio of cash flows from operation to earnings could indicate that how much 
cash flow that companies could generate that is relative to earnings under the 




earnings’ ability to measure firms’ performance relative to cash flows, suggesting 
more accruals signify greater improvement over the underlying cash flows. 
However, Sloan (1996) indicates that extreme large level of accruals is indicative of 
poor earnings quality. Basically, this ratio is developed under this intuition, by 
simply looking at ratio of cash flow relative to earnings so as to obtain the level of 
accruals. If the ratio is high in absolute value, which may indicate the level of 
accruals is high.  
Companies in different industries may have different reporting behavirour. 
Firms that operate in different industries may have different fundamental business 
characteristics that affect the quality of earnings. For instance, values of the cash 
flows may be affected by the industry in which the company operates. Therefore, the 
comparison of accounting quality within each industry needs to be further analysed. 
In this section, we compare the accounting quality within each industry for three 
groups of companies. 
If the ratio is high in absolute value, which may indicate the level of accruals is 
high. However, if ratio of cash flows to earnings is negative, this includes two 
situations, (1) positive cash flows with negative earnings and (2) negative cash flow 
with positive earnings. Positive cash flows with negative earnings are the indication 
of accruals adjusting matching and timing problems encountered by cash flows. 
However, those companies having negative cash flow with positive earnings are 
likely to have accruals back up their losses in order to report profit. Therefore, taking 
into account of these situations, we split the observations into two categories: one is 
with positive earnings and the other one is with negative earnings in order to further 






6. Results and Analysis 
 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics of CFO and E 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for CFO and Earnings for each group 
of companies. Large companies amounts the largest CFO and Earnings compared 
with the other two groups of companies. There is a huge gap between lowest and 
highest of CFO and Earnings, which is indicative of large variances of CFO and 
earnings in each group. Further, large companies amounts the highest variance, 
followed by medium companies, and small companies the last. 





TABLE 2: Summary Statistics for CFO and Earnings 
 
 Large Companies Medium-sized Companies Small Companies 
Variables 𝐶𝐹𝑂 𝐸 𝐶𝐹𝑂 𝐸 𝐶𝐹𝑂 𝐸 
No. of observations 2,253 2,253 35,596 35,596 8,297 8,297 
Mean 56,317 20,664 5,731 3,539 187 163 
Std Deviation 790,745 209,895 159,555 151,689 1,022 1,030 
Min -2,614,000 -913,000 -20,500,000 -20,500,000 -26,979 -26,980 
1st Percentile -25,153 -48,200 -23,100 -23,261 -1,469 -1,123 
5th Percentile -3,839 -6,089 -3,107 -2,941 -428 -251 
25th Percentile -59 -76 0 1 4 18 
Median 464 234 565 281 125 113 
75th Percentile 3,465 1,728 1,969 1,044 280 211 
95th Percentile 119,400 60,992 17,450 9,861 910 616 
99th Percentile 1,118,000 505,000 119,400 77,100 2,514 1,758 
Max 32,200,000 7,968,000 9,754,000 9,750,000 32,949 33,114 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for variables of 𝐶𝐹𝑂 and 𝐸. The statistics are reported separately for large, medium-sized and small companies. 
All values are in thousands form (except the standard deviation).  
Variable Definition:  𝐸 = Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for the observation year of 2010; 𝐶𝐹𝑂 = Net cash flow from operation in the 
observation year of 2010, it is defined as Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for the observation year of 2010 + Depreciation – Changes in 
Working Capital. 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are 
those have turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, following with UK 
GAAP. Small companies are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 





6.2 Distributions of CFO/E  
[Figure 1 Here] 
Figure 1 presents the result of frequency distribution of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 using the mean and 
standard deviation of each large, medium and small companies sample. Panel A 
presents the frequency distribution of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 based on all companies-observations. 
Panel B presents the frequency distribution of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 based on companies positive 
earnings group. Panel C presents the frequency distribution of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 based on 
companies with negative earnings group.  
Panel A indicates that, small companies (57.78%) have more proportions of 
observations greater than mean, comparing with large (9.99%) and medium 
companies (7.05%). The majority of observations for large (89.66%) and medium 
(92.85%) companies fall below the mean. Further, the proportions of large and small 
companies fall out the ±2σ regions are relatively more than medium companies, 
suggesting there are more large and small companies with extreme level of accruals.  
From Panel B, companies fall below 0 have negative cash flows and positive 
earnings, suggesting that companies have more tendencies to use accruals to manage 




 ≤ 0 are relatively similar for three groups of companies, which are around 
15% of each sample. When earnings are positive, there are fewer proportions of 
medium companies (5.13%) lie into the range of mean ≤ 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 ≤ 2σ, but more 
proportions of medium companies (79.72%) fall into the range of 0 <
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 < mean, 
comparing with large and small companies. Furthermore, there are still more 
proportions of large and small companies fall out the ±2σ regions in positive 
earnings group.  
When earnings are negative, companies fall below 0 have positive cash flows 
and negative earnings, implying companies have more cash flows to back up their 
losses, i.e. fewer tendencies to manage earnings. From Panel C of Figure 1, the 




are less than medium (28.30+16.72%) companies. This suggests that when earnings 
are negative, there are more proportions of medium companies that are able to cover 
their losses with the positive cash flows comparing with large and small companies. 
However, there are more proportions of medium and small companies fall out the 
±2σ regions, suggesting that medium and small companies have more proportions of 
companies with extreme level of accruals when earnings are negative. 
 
Key Findings from Figure 1: 
1. Overall, the distribution of medium companies is different from large and 
small companies.  
2. When earnings are positive, the distributions for large and small companies 
are similar, that more proportions of companies have extreme level of 
accrual. 
3. When earnings are negative, there are more proportions medium companies 
that are able to cover their losses comparing with large and small companies. 
4. Furthermore, there are more proportions of small companies with extreme 





Figure 1: Statistical frequency distribution of ratio of CFO to Earnings 
Panel A:  
 
Panel B:  
 
Panel C:  
 
This figure presents statistical frequency distribution of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 based on the mean and standard 
deviation of each companies sample, where, 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛= mean of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 for each type of companies in each 
earnings group, σ = standard deviation of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 for each type of companies in each earnings group. 
Total No. of Large: 2,253 
Total No. of Medium: 35,596 
Total No. of Small: 8,297 
Total No. of Large: 1,603 
Total No. of Medium: 26,706 
Total No. of Small: 6,775 
Total No. of Large: 650 
Total No. of Medium: 8,890 




Variable definitions: 𝐸 = Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for company 𝑖 in 
group 𝑔 and industry 𝑘 in the observation year of 2010; 𝐶𝐹𝑂 = Net cash flow from operation for 
company 𝑖 in group 𝑔 and industry 𝑘 in the observation year of 2010, it is defined as Net income after 
interest, tax and extraordinary items for the observation year of 2010 + Depreciation – Changes in 
Working Capital. 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are those have turnover of not more than 
£25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, 
following with UK GAAP. Small companies are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a 
balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees, following with 
FRESSE. 
 
The percentage is calculated as the number of companies in each slot divided by the total number of 
each group of companies in each earnings group. 




The distributions consist of three earnings groups – all companies, companies with positive earnings, 
and companies with negative earnings. Each mean and 2σ belongs to each type of companies (i.e. 





6.3 Distributions of SMEs vs. Distribution of Large companies  
[Figure 2 Here] 




large, medium and small companies based on the mean and standard deviation of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 from large companies across different earnings group. Panel A of Figure 3.2 
presents the comparisons of distribution based on all earnings groups. Panel B 
presents the comparison based on positive earnings group, whereas Panel C 
presents the comparison based on negative earnings group.  
Panel A of Figure 2 presents the result of comparisons of distribution from 
all earnings groups, there are more proportion of small companies have occurred 
in −2𝜎𝐿 ≤ 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 < 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐿 comparing with large and medium companies. 
Furthermore, medium and small companies have fewer proportions with extreme 
level of accruals comparing with large companies. Overall, the distribution of 
medium and small companies are similar with large companies.  
When earnings are positive, the comparisons of distribution between large, 
medium and small companies are shown in Panel B. The distribution of medium 
companies is quite similar with large companies. The proportions of three groups 
of companies fall below 0 are similar, suggesting proportions of companies have 
more tendencies to manage earnings are similar. As for small companies, there 
are more proportions of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 just above 0 and below the 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐿 (77.92%), but 
less proportions of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 above the 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐿 comparing with large and small 
companies. This suggests that there are more proportions of large and small 
companies have higher level of accruals comparing with small companies. 
When earnings are negative, as shown in Panel C, the distribution of 
medium companies is different from large and small companies. There are nearly 
46% of medium companies that is smaller than 0, which are more than the 
proportions of large and small companies. This suggests that there are more 
proportions of medium companies have positive cash flows when earnings are 




fall out the ±2σ, suggesting that more proportions of medium companies with 
extreme level of accruals than large and small companies. 
 
Key Findings from Figure 2: 
The findings are generally consistent with previous findings from Figure 1.  
When earnings are positive, distributions of three groups of companies are 
similar. The proportions of companies below 0 are similar across three groups of 
companies. However, the proportions of large companies with extreme level of 
accruals are larger than medium and small companies.  
When earnings are negative, medium companies seem to outperform large 
and small companies, because the proportions of medium companies with 
positive cash flows relative to negative earnings are more than that of large and 
small companies. However, there are more proportions of medium companies 






Figure 2: The Comparison of statistical frequency distribution of ratio of CFO to 





Panel C:  
 




large, medium and small companies based on the sample mean and standard deviation of large 
Total No. of Large: 2,253 
Total No. of Medium: 35,596 
Total No. of Small: 8,297 
Total No. of Large: 1,603 
Total No. of Medium: 26,706 
Total No. of Small: 6,775 
Total No. of Large: 650 
Total No. of Medium: 8,890 




companies in each earnings group, where, 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐿= mean of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 in large companies in each 
earnings group, 𝜎𝐿= standard deviation of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 in large companies in each earnings group. 
 
Variable definitions: 𝐸 = Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for company 𝑖 in 
group 𝑔 and industry 𝑘 in the observation year of 2010; 𝐶𝐹𝑂 = Net cash flow from operation for 
company 𝑖 in group 𝑔 and industry 𝑘 in the observation year of 2010, it is defined as Net income 
after interest, tax and extraordinary items for the observation year of 2010 + Depreciation – 
Changes in Working Capital. 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are those have turnover of not more 
than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 
employees, following with UK GAAP. Small companies are those have turnover of not more 
than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 
employees, following with FRESSE. 
 
The percentage is calculated as the number of companies in each slot divided by the total number 
of each group of companies in each earnings group.  
The region is defined based on the mean and standard deviation (σ) of statistical distribution of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 from large companies. The distributions consist of three earnings groups – all companies, 
companies with positive earnings, and companies with negative earnings.  
In order to compare the statistical distribution of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
, we take the distribution of large companies 
as benchmark, and calculate the number of each medium and small companies happens to fall 
into the regions of distribution of large companies in each earnings group. The 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐿 and 2𝜎𝐿 





6.4 Variations of CFO/E across groups and industries  
[Table 3 Here] 
Table 3 presents the detailed descriptive statistics of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 across different 




three types of companies seem very different but they are not statistically 
different (-1.06, -0.37 and 1.61). Medium companies have the highest mean 
(7.60) may suggest that the level of accruals is higher than large companies (-
5.99) and small companies (0.98). The mean of large companies is negative, 
which could be either positive cash flows with negative earnings or negative cash 
flows with positive earnings. Therefore, analysis of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 based on positive and 





 percentile, the 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 does not differentiate too much across three 
groups of companies, suggesting three groups of companies within this region 
have similar level of accruals. The standard deviation of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 in medium 
companies is largest (775.30), followed by large companies (576.30) and small 
companies (31.50). The large variance could be due to the influences of extreme 
values (outliers) in each group of companies, as shown in Table 3.1, there is huge 
gap between lowest and highest value of CFO and earnings.   
The first finding in Table 3 is that the overall accounting quality for three 
types of companies does not vary too much given the mean of ratio is not 
statistically significant between each other, but accounting quality within 
medium companies group is varied the most and accounting quality within small 
companies is rather similar given the largest standard deviatoin in medium 
companies and the smallest standard deviation in small companies. 
Table 3 also presents the result of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 across different industries for each 
group of companies. With 10 industry sectors allocated into each group of 
companies, it is possible to analyse the behavior of each group of companies in 
each industry. The means of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 from 10 industries in large companies group are 
almost similar except the means in Construction (8.07) and Education & Health 




industries have higher level of accruals. The negative ratio will then be analysed 




Primary (0.03) is less than 1 that cash flows only amounts a few percentage of 
their earnings, implying that companies in Primary sector have more accruals 
component in their earnings. As for standard deviation of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 across different 
industries for large companies, only Construction (64.72) and Education & 
Health (897.10) amounts the higher standard deviation.  
Therefore, the second part of findings in Table 3 is that accounting quality 
for large companies across different industries is almost similar, except 
companies in Construction and Education & Health, which have higher means 
and higher standard deviation, suggesting level of accruals is higher in these two 
sectors. Further, companies in Primary sector have the smallest mean, implying 
that their earnings have more accrual component and less cash flows to back up 
their earnings, which may lead less persistence of earnings. 
The means of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 from 10 industries in medium companies group varies 
from each industry. There are two negative means in Primary (-0.27) and 
Construction (-2.82), which need to be analysed in positive and earnings group. 
Education & Health amounts the highest mean, suggesting that medium 




 vary across different industries for medium companies, with 
Education & Health amounts (1,219.00) the highest. Therefore, third part of 
findings in Table 3 is that accounting quality is different within medium 
companies across different industries, given different means and different 
standard deviations across industries.  
As for small companies, the mean of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 across different industries does 
not vary too much, with only Transport having largest mean (4.10) and largest 
standard deviation (62.17). Another finding in Table 3.3 is that quality within 
small companies group does not vary too much.  
Comparing the means of three types of companies across industries, the 




different from small and large companies, given the statistically significant 
differences in Construction (1.69, -1.76), Service (2.42), Telecom (1.76) and 
Education & Health (1.68). Further, the accounting quality of large companies 
and small companies does not have much difference, except in Wholesale (1.96). 
Standard deviations in medium companies across industries are relatively larger 
than that in large and small companies, suggesting that accounting quality across 
industries in medium companies is varied more than in large and small 
companies. 
 
Key findings from Table 3: 
1. The level of accruals in medium companies is relatively higher than large 
companies and small companies, given medium companies amount the 




2. The accounting quality is varied the most within medium companies 
because they have large standard deviations across 10 industries. 
3. Overall, the accounting quality of medium companies is different from 
large and small companies, though the means of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸





TABLE 3: Industrial Distribution and Summary Statistics for ratio of CFO to Earnings 




Large Companies (𝒈=L) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 94 528 29 127 318 55 97 39 37 929 2,253 
Mean 0.03 1.48 2.13 8.07 1.41 2.42 2.38 0.49 1.71 -17.49 -5.99 
Std Deviation 4.28 10.92 2.31 64.72 14.54 10.76 22.96 14.75 2.77 897.10 576.30 
Min -21.65 -139.60 -4.07 -28.07 -170.10 -44.67 -128.20 -85.67 -4.93 -21,554.00 -21,554.00 
1st Percentile -21.65 -20.00 -4.07 -18.12 -25.12 -44.67 -128.20 -85.67 -4.93 -57.67 -35.29 
5th Percentile -7.00 -2.28 0.01 -9.13 -3.30 -2.08 -5.28 -4.39 -1.28 -8.25 -5.28 
25th Percentile -0.29 0.41 1.26 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.52 0.93 0.61 -0.08 0.10 
Median 0.34 1.12 1.91 0.99 1.13 1.51 1.51 1.96 1.17 1.00 1.03 
75th Percentile 1.13 2.19 2.72 2.72 2.07 2.59 3.34 3.01 2.74 2.15 2.22 
95th Percentile 3.13 8.29 8.51 19.10 5.99 15.77 13.06 12.55 7.70 12.44 10.80 
99th Percentile 22.67 22.21 8.81 60.80 28.72 58.13 178.00 18.00 12.25 83.70 50.52 
Max 22.67 161.00 8.81 722.00 143.80 58.13 178.00 18.00 12.25 10,817.00 10,817.00 
 
Medium-sized Companies (𝒈=M) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 675 7,494 273 1,975 6,438 1,282 1,731 339 1,087 14,302 35,596 
Mean -0.27 0.81 1.72 -2.82 0.19 3.70 3.02 5.17 1.30 17.85 7.60 
Std Deviation 36.52 103.40 25.59 128.40 60.62 32.82 71.63 48.73 85.60 1,219.00 775.30 
Min -885.80 -8,138.00 -142.00 -3,932.00 -2,457.00 -182.20 -992.00 -166.20 -1,620.00 -13,040.00 -13,040.00 
1st Percentile -59.08 -27.52 -67.83 -152.60 -51.00 -38.03 -55.06 -23.67 -57.44 -51.96 -48.75 
5th Percentile -5.42 -4.69 -10.14 -15.45 -8.29 -4.66 -7.56 -5.11 -6.21 -6.36 -6.79 
25th Percentile 0.35 0.28 0.23 -0.82 -0.13 0.12 0.19 0.23 0.51 0.37 0.18 
Median 1.15 1.12 1.15 1.02 1.04 1.22 1.27 1.01 1.16 1.00 1.00 
75th Percentile 2.31 2.18 2.28 2.86 2.38 2.63 2.96 1.97 2.14 1.81 2.16 
95th Percentile 7.73 9.03 8.60 13.87 11.09 10.65 13.29 12.67 8.90 10.33 10.40 
99th Percentile 29.85 44.86 70.43 85.29 50.78 87.27 65.20 91.91 60.80 76.09 60.38 
Max 155.20 1,862.00 306.40 1,882.00 1,072.00 721.00 2,322.00 669.50 1,924.00 118,239.00 118,239.00 
(Continued on next page) 
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Small Companies (𝒈=S) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 168 367 37 1,092 1,485 204 320 111 359 4,154 8,297 
Mean 1.19 2.61 -5.02 2.72 -0.55 1.17 4.10 0.44 1.05 0.72 0.98 
Std Deviation 25.26 19.88 38.62 40.55 22.37 7.19 62.17 5.16 5.76 31.50 31.50 
Min -139.00 -159.50 -232.50 -561.10 -464.00 -40.00 -182.00 -37.00 -22.36 -1,298.00 -1,298.00 
1st Percentile -128.60 -23.00 -232.50 -50.00 -67.67 -18.50 -44.00 -28.86 -13.14 -28.83 -36.69 
5th Percentile -4.22 -4.57 -8.31 -8.35 -9.00 -6.00 -5.10 -2.08 -2.73 -3.20 -5.29 
25th Percentile 0.68 0.21 0.59 -0.16 0.02 0.57 0.23 0.45 0.77 0.69 0.44 
Median 1.04 0.98 1.07 1.00 0.96 1.10 1.02 1.00 1.04 1.00 1.00 
75th Percentile 1.67 1.48 1.42 2.25 1.80 1.71 1.91 1.38 1.27 1.33 1.50 
95th Percentile 8.18 6.00 5.44 15.08 8.83 6.94 6.82 3.87 2.97 5.50 7.50 
99th Percentile 136.30 117.70 19.13 75.56 34.00 28.00 60.00 7.45 10.00 35.00 41.20 
Max 205.00 191.00 19.13 682.00 101.00 61.50 1,076.00 18.65 91.00 327.00 1,076.00 
            
t-stat (L-M)a 0.21 0.53 0.25 1.69* 1.10 -0.74 -0.22 -1.32 0.15 -1.13 -1.06 
t-stat (L-S)b -0.58 -0.98 1.12 0.91 1.96** 0.81 -0.41 0.02 1.21 -0.62 -0.37 
t-stat (M-S)c -0.61 -1.14 1.03 -1.76* 0.77 2.42*** -0.28 1.76* 0.10 1.68* 1.61 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of (
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
)𝑖,𝑔,𝑘 across different industries for large, medium-sized and small companies, where, 𝑖 = 1, …, 𝑛𝑔,𝑘; 𝑔 = L (Large 
companies), M (Medium-sized companies), S (Small companies); 𝑘 = Industry 1, 2, … 10. 
Variable definitions: 𝐸 = Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for company 𝑖 in group 𝑔 and industry 𝑘 in the observation year of 2010; 𝐶𝐹𝑂 = Net cash 
flow from operation for company 𝑖 in group 𝑔 and industry 𝑘 in the observation year of 2010, it is defined as Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for the 
observation year of 2010 + Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital. 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are those have 
turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, following with UK GAAP. Small companies 
are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees, following with FRESSE. 
a
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between large and medium-sized companies’ means. 
b
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between large and small companies’ means. 
c
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between medium-sized and small companies’ means. 






, there could be two scenarios. The first scenario is that 
positive cash flows with negative earnings, which is the indication of matching and 
timing problems for cash flows not the result poor quality of accounting. Second one 
is that companies have negative cash flow with positive earnings, which might be the 
indication of poor quality of accounting. Furthermore, from Table 3, large 
companies have a negative mean of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
, which may include two scenarios. 
Therefore, the observations are divided into two groups: one is with positive 
earnings (Table 4) and the other one is with negative earnings (Table 3.5). 
 
6.5 Positive Earnings Group 
[Table 4 Here] 
Table 4 presents the result of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 across different industries for each group of 
companies with positive earnings. The means of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 for three types of companies are 
not statistically different, suggesting that the accounting quality of three types 
companies is relatively similar statistically. Still, medium companies (11.27) have 
higher level of accruals than large (5.03) and small (1.59) companies do. Given the 
results in Table 3, that large companies have negative mean of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
. However, after 
splitting companies into positive and negative earnings groups in Table 4, the mean 
of large companies turns to positive. The reason why large companies have negative 




 for medium companies is the largest (877.60), follow by large 
companies (420.10) and small companies (24.56), suggesting that accounting quality 
in medium companies group is more varied than large and small companies.  
The first findings in Table 4 is consistent with Table 3, that the overall 
accounting quality for companies with positive earnings does not vary too much 
between the three groups. But accounting quality within medium companies group is 
varied the most and accounting quality within small companies is least varied. 
Another finding in Table 4 is that large companies with positive earnings 
across industries behave similarly, given all positive means and relatively similar 
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variances across industries, except companies in Education & Health with largest 
mean (8.43) and largest standard deviation (661.90). In Table 3, the mean of Primary 
is the smallest and the mean of Education & Health is negative, however, in Table 4 
here, all means of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 are greater than one and positive, implying that loss-making 
companies influence the overall results in these industries.  
Medium companies with positive earnings in Table 4 have rather different 
means and standard deviations. Primary and Other Services have a mean less than 1, 
0.61 and 0.54, suggesting that medium companies in these industries have less cash 
flows to back up their earnings. Construction has the negative mean, which is the 
same in Table 3, suggesting that medium companies in Construction use accruals to 
back up the negative cash flows into positive earnings, which may suggest that 
companies in this sector have more tendencies to manage earnings. The standard 
deviations of all medium companies with positive earnings across industries are 
relatively large, with Education & Health having the largest standard deviation 
(1418.00). The third part of findings in Table 4 is that quality of earnings is varied 
within medium companies with positive earnings. Companies in Construction may 
have more tendencies to manage earnings.  
The means of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 in small companies with positive earnings are similar across 
industries, except in Wholesale (-0.01). Negative cash flows amount 1 percent of 
positive earnings in Wholesale, implying that companies use accruals to back up the 
negative cash flows into positive earnings and have more tendencies to manage 
earnings into positive. Overall, the variances of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 across industries for small 
companies with positive earnings are relatively similar.  
The final finding in Table 4 is that, the accounting quality of small companies 
in Construction, Wholesale, Service, Telecom and Other Services is statistically 
different with large and medium companies. Large companies and medium 
companies are not so different across industries, except in Construction (2.23). 
Again, variances in medium companies across industries are relatively larger than 
that in large and small companies, suggesting that accounting quality across 




Key Findings from Table 4: 
1. In consistent with Table 3, medium companies have higher level of accruals 
than large and small companies with positive earnings.  
2. Furthermore, the accounting quality is still varied the most within medium 
companies group with positive earnings. 
3. Medium companies in Construction and small companies in Wholesale may 
have more tendencies to manage earnings, as accruals are used to back up the 
negative cash flows into positive earnings. 
4. The accounting quality of small companies in Construction, Wholesale, 
Service, Telecom and Other Services is statistically different with large and 





TABLE 4: Industrial Distribution and Summary Statistics for ratio of CFO to Earnings (Positive Earnings) 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = (
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
)𝑖,𝑔,𝑘, where, 𝐸 > 0 
Large Companies (𝒈=L) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 27 371 25 95 265 41 73 32 28 646 1,603 
Mean 1.73 2.27 2.54 3.56 2.32 3.48 5.49 3.46 2.14 8.43 5.03 
Std Deviation 4.80 12.55 2.05 11.39 11.45 12.29 21.03 4.08 2.87 661.90 420.10 
Min -7.00 -139.60 0.01 -18.12 -29.00 -44.67 -15.50 -2.63 -4.93 -5,134.00 -5,134.00 
1st Percentile -7.00 -19.50 0.01 -18.12 -19.23 -44.67 -15.50 -2.63 -4.93 -115.70 -29.00 
5th Percentile -2.75 -1.47 0.08 -9.13 -2.48 0.80 -1.23 -2.16 -0.79 -5.50 -2.96 
25th Percentile -0.03 0.87 1.61 0.38 0.58 1.06 1.10 1.70 1.07 0.48 0.69 
Median 0.90 1.48 2.01 1.17 1.26 2.04 2.07 2.18 1.66 1.30 1.46 
75th Percentile 2.29 2.62 2.78 2.95 2.15 3.46 3.69 3.49 2.88 2.74 2.72 
95th Percentile 5.27 10.96 8.51 22.27 5.99 15.77 15.61 12.55 7.70 15.26 12.94 
99th Percentile 22.67 27.57 8.81 60.80 39.25 58.13 178.00 18.00 12.25 125.00 60.67 
Max 22.67 161.00 8.81 60.80 143.80 58.13 178.00 18.00 12.25 10,817.00 10,817.00 
 
Medium-sized Companies (𝒈=M) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 520 5,802 190 1,510 5,263 851 1,327 244 804 10,195 26,706 
Mean 0.61 3.23 4.50 -4.58 1.39 7.32 5.84 7.25 0.54 25.93 11.27 
Std Deviation 40.74 39.57 27.44 134.60 53.83 38.34 75.26 56.02 71.35 1,418.00 877.60 
Min -885.80 -909.90 -67.83 -3,932.00 -2,457.00 -58.67 -279.50 -166.20 -1,620.00 -3,405.00 -3,932.00 
1st Percentile -28.85 -13.38 -64.49 -163.60 -27.74 -12.23 -21.97 -17.51 -42.75 -26.00 -26.15 
5th Percentile -1.74 -2.54 -1.03 -12.89 -5.51 -0.15 -2.78 -2.73 -1.41 -2.71 -3.66 
25th Percentile 0.93 0.71 1.00 -0.31 0.28 1.18 0.92 0.85 1.00 0.95 0.75 
Median 1.46 1.32 1.62 1.28 1.24 2.03 1.66 1.18 1.43 1.05 1.23 
75th Percentile 2.64 2.45 2.72 3.20 2.60 3.56 3.50 2.45 2.52 2.30 2.58 
95th Percentile 8.66 9.52 11.50 14.50 11.88 16.41 14.22 14.93 12.08 11.69 11.59 
99th Percentile 29.85 48.35 162.90 69.88 50.78 133.00 65.20 91.91 58.89 77.94 62.93 
Max 155.20 1,862.00 306.40 1,591.00 1,072.00 721.00 2,322.00 669.50 689.80 118,239.00 118,239.00 
(Continued on next page) 
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Small Companies (𝒈=S) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 135 316 30 870 1,173 148 269 84 296 3,454 6,775 
Mean 3.70 3.00 1.68 2.75 -0.01 2.08 6.31 1.19 1.33 1.28 1.59 
Std Deviation 22.61 21.27 3.52 38.27 21.68 7.70 66.19 2.58 6.04 15.65 24.56 
Min -84.43 -159.50 -1.82 -561.10 -464.00 -40.00 -44.00 -9.20 -18.50 -445.00 -561.10 
1st Percentile -20.04 -12.50 -1.82 -36.69 -37.33 -22.89 -10.13 -9.20 -13.14 -13.00 -21.00 
5th Percentile -1.13 -3.12 -1.75 -5.97 -7.23 -1.73 -3.82 -0.72 -0.53 -1.62 -3.25 
25th Percentile 0.98 0.42 0.88 0.15 0.18 0.97 0.48 0.74 0.94 0.83 0.64 
Median 1.15 1.00 1.19 1.04 1.00 1.26 1.08 1.05 1.07 1.00 1.01 
75th Percentile 1.79 1.57 1.42 2.38 1.86 2.00 1.96 1.41 1.29 1.36 1.56 
95th Percentile 9.00 6.00 4.46 16.00 8.97 7.00 11.00 3.10 2.95 5.00 7.52 
99th Percentile 136.30 117.70 19.13 54.20 34.00 41.18 62.33 18.65 16.90 25.07 36.81 
Max 205.00 191.00 19.13 682.00 98.00 61.50 1,076.00 18.65 91.00 327.00 1,076.00 
            
t-stat (L-M)a 0.55 -1.16 -0.96 2.23** 0.90 -1.65 -0.11 -1.04 0.62 -0.59 -0.53 
t-stat (L-S)b -0.92 -0.54 1.13 0.46 2.46** 0.70 -0.17 2.93*** 1.26 0.27 0.33 
t-stat (M-S)c -1.17 0.18 1.35 -1.98** 1.44 3.59*** -0.10 1.69* -0.31 1.76* 0.91 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of (
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
)𝑖,𝑔,𝑘 across different industries for large, medium-sized and small companies with positive E (Earnings), where, 𝑖 = 1, …, 
𝑛𝑔,𝑘; 𝑔 = L (Large companies), M (Medium-sized companies), S (Small companies); 𝑘 = Industry 1, 2, … 10. 
Variable definitions: 𝐸 = Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for company 𝑖 in group 𝑔 and industry 𝑘 in the observation year of 2010; 𝐶𝐹𝑂 = Net cash 
flow from operation for company 𝑖 in group 𝑔 and industry 𝑘 in the observation year of 2010, it is defined as Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for the 
observation year of 2010 + Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital. 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are those have 
turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, following with UK GAAP. Small companies 
are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees, following with FRESSE. 
a
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between large and medium-sized companies’ means. 
b
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between large and small companies’ means. 
c
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between medium-sized and small companies’ means. 
*, **, *** represent statistically significant different at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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6.6 Negative Earnings Group  
If companies with negative earnings with positive cash flows, which give rise 
to a negative 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
. This suggests that companies have enough cash flows to back up 
the negative earnings, i.e. less tendency to manage earnings. If the 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 turns to 
positive, it means companies have negative earnings with negative cash flows. The 
extremely high level of accruals may be an indication of poor accounting quality.  
 
[Table 5 Here] 
In Table 5, the overall means for three types of companies are all negative, 
suggesting companies have cash flows to back up their losses, especially in large 
companies (-33.15). This also suggests that level of accruals is higher in large 
companies than medium and small companies. The means of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 are not statistically 




 for three types of companies are different, with large companies 
having the greatest (846.00). 
Considering within industry variation, large companies in Construction, which 
amount the positive means with negative earnings (21.44), suggesting that large 
companies in this industry have more negative cash flows relative to losses. The 
standard deviations of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 across industries are relatively small except in 
Construction (128.00) and Education & Health (1281.00). In general, large 
companies with losses behave relatively similar except in Construction and 
Education & Health, which the level of accruals is high and variations in accounting 
quality are high.  
Medium companies with losses behave similarly except in Construction and 
Other Services, where means of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 are positive, suggesting that medium companies 
in these two industries have more firms with negative cash flows relative to negative 
earnings. The standard deviations of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 across industries are relatively different 
though the overall variances are smaller than those in large companies.  
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The results of small companies in Table 5 are similar to large companies, as 
only Construction amounts the positive means of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸




 are large in Utility (87.76) and Education & Health (68.38).  
Overall, medium companies in Primary, Utility, and Service behave differently 
from large and small companies. Furthermore, the variances within each industry in 
medium companies group are larger than those in large and small companies, 
suggesting the variations in accounting quality within medium companies group is 
the largest.  
 
Key findings from Table 5: 
1. Level of accruals in large companies is higher than medium and small 
companies, but the mean of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
 is negative (positive cash flows with negative 
earnings). This may be due to the financial crisis, that large companies are 
required to write off huge losses during this period. 
2. The variation in accounting quality within medium companies group is still 
the largest. 
3. Considering variation within each industry, Construction is different from 
other industries, which has higher variation in accounting quality and less 






TABLE 5: Industrial Distribution and Summary Statistics for ratio of CFO to Earnings (Negative Earnings) 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = (
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
)𝑖,𝑔,𝑘, where, 𝐸 < 0 
Large Companies (𝒈=L) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 67 157 4 32 53 14 24 7 9 283 650 
Mean -0.65 -0.37 -0.48 21.44 -3.10 -0.70 -7.08 -13.08 0.37 -76.66 -33.15 
Std Deviation 3.88 4.99 2.42 128.00 24.47 1.49 26.31 32.09 2.04 1,281.00 846.00 
Min -21.65 -40.43 -4.07 -28.07 -170.10 -5.44 -128.20 -85.67 -1.28 -21,554.00 -21,554.00 
1st Percentile -21.65 -26.89 -4.07 -28.07 -170.10 -5.44 -128.20 -85.67 -1.28 -35.29 -36.75 
5th Percentile -7.21 -8.14 -4.07 -17.50 -6.44 -5.44 -22.35 -85.67 -1.28 -11.36 -9.21 
25th Percentile -0.44 -0.05 -1.88 -0.73 -1.03 -0.66 -3.37 -4.39 -0.83 -0.91 -0.68 
Median 0.21 0.51 0.56 0.34 -0.09 -0.26 -0.41 -0.08 -0.17 0.20 0.26 
75th Percentile 0.79 0.92 0.93 1.01 0.91 0.02 0.64 0.86 0.61 1.00 0.94 
95th Percentile 2.73 3.39 1.03 10.80 3.80 0.27 1.22 0.93 5.41 8.85 4.23 
99th Percentile 2.91 8.23 1.03 722.00 28.72 0.27 7.22 0.93 5.41 15.00 14.67 
Max 2.91 8.29 1.03 722.00 28.72 0.27 7.22 0.93 5.41 52.75 722.00 
 
Medium-sized Companies (𝒈=M) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 155 1,692 83 465 1,175 431 404 95 283 4,107 8,890 
Mean -3.24 -7.51 -4.65 2.89 -5.20 -3.45 -6.24 -0.16 3.47 -2.19 -3.42 
Std Deviation 15.23 204.70 19.43 105.80 84.41 15.03 57.23 19.71 117.10 424.60 305.60 
Min -98.71 -8,138.00 -142.00 -544.00 -1,842.00 -182.20 -992.00 -80.64 -254.20 -13,040.00 -13,040.00 
1st Percentile -96.82 -95.36 -142.00 -110.70 -149.00 -84.03 -128.30 -80.64 -146.00 -120.50 -125.00 
5th Percentile -21.36 -13.68 -35.77 -20.44 -31.20 -13.81 -29.41 -9.51 -14.96 -16.54 -18.07 
25th Percentile -1.56 -1.27 -2.23 -2.76 -2.61 -1.68 -2.83 -1.08 -1.79 -1.28 -1.61 
Median 0.11 0.26 0.04 0.07 -0.09 -0.31 -0.20 0.35 -0.07 0.52 0.23 
75th Percentile 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.46 1.00 0.65 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 
95th Percentile 4.23 6.09 3.29 11.33 7.75 1.26 5.58 3.32 2.92 5.00 5.70 
99th Percentile 25.73 31.06 13.55 166.60 51.77 7.62 55.80 149.40 77.82 72.83 49.71 
Max 33.50 1,191.00 13.55 1,882.00 743.80 16.55 274.00 149.40 1,924.00 18,349.00 18,349.00 
(Continued on next page) 
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Small Companies (𝒈=S) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 33 51 7 222 312 56 51 27 63 700 1,522 
Mean -9.10 0.18 -33.73 2.56 -2.56 -1.24 -7.57 -1.89 -0.26 -2.03 -1.77 
Std Deviation 32.47 6.16 87.76 48.55 24.72 4.90 31.79 9.16 3.97 68.38 52.12 
Min -139.00 -23.00 -232.50 -242.00 -228.00 -18.50 -182.00 -37.00 -22.36 -1,298.00 -1,298.00 
1st Percentile -139.00 -23.00 -232.50 -103.00 -116.00 -18.50 -182.00 -37.00 -22.36 -112.00 -128.60 
5th Percentile -128.60 -6.62 -232.50 -15.52 -17.80 -10.60 -48.20 -28.86 -6.00 -19.50 -18.17 
25th Percentile -1.68 -1.54 -8.31 -1.06 -0.98 -1.10 -1.15 -0.72 -0.86 -0.39 -0.78 
Median -0.22 0.44 -0.32 0.38 0.53 0.49 0.59 0.60 0.64 0.83 0.68 
75th Percentile 0.99 1.06 2.40 1.39 1.40 0.91 1.35 1.00 1.10 1.13 1.17 
95th Percentile 3.00 13.51 5.44 9.92 8.63 1.82 4.56 3.87 4.75 7.27 7.05 
99th Percentile 8.18 26.00 5.44 99.00 33.67 12.00 6.18 5.40 10.00 153.10 84.00 
Max 8.18 26.00 5.44 493.80 101.00 12.00 6.18 5.40 10.00 326.70 493.80 
            
t-stat (L-M)a 1.97** 1.43 1.70* 0.80 0.50 3.33*** -0.14 -1.05 -0.44 -0.97 -0.89 
t-stat (L-S)b 1.49 -0.58 1.00 0.83 -0.15 0.70 0.07 -0.91 0.75 -0.98 -1.44 
t-stat (M-S)c 1.01 -1.52 0.87 0.06 -0.93 -2.27** 0.25 0.65 0.53 -0.02 -0.21 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of (
𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝐸
)𝑖,𝑔,𝑘 across different industries for large, medium-sized and small companies with negative E (Earnings), where, 𝑖 = 1, …, 
𝑛𝑔,𝑘; 𝑔 = L (Large companies), M (Medium-sized companies), S (Small companies); 𝑘 = Industry 1, 2, … 10. 
Variable definitions: 𝐸 = Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for company 𝑖 in group 𝑔 and industry 𝑘 in the observation year of 2010; 𝐶𝐹𝑂 = Net cash 
flow from operation for company 𝑖 in group 𝑔 and industry 𝑘 in the observation year of 2010, it is defined as Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for the 
observation year of 2010 + Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital. 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are those have 
turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, following with UK GAAP. Small companies 
are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees, following with FRESSE. 
a
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between large and medium-sized companies’ means. 
b
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between large and small companies’ means. 
c
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between medium-sized and small companies’ means. 




7. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The objective of this study is to compare the accounting quality of large (public 
companies), medium and small companies under current differential reporting framework. 
The variation of accounting quality for each group depends on the objectives of differential 
reporting. However, the regulators do not clearly specify the expectation of accounting 
quality and consequences that different groups of companies should follow. The purpose of 
this study is to compare the accounting quality of different groups companies under different 
accounting standards, so as to examine whether differential reporting framework has led any 
variation of accounting quality between groups.  
From the analysis of ratio of cash flows relative to earnings, the basic understanding of 
financial reporting behaviours for each group of companies is obtained. Overall, large 
companies and small companies have similar financial reporting behaviour across industries. 
Medium companies are different from large and small companies, that they have higher level 
of accruals in general and the most varied earnings quality across and within each industry. 
That means, under current regulatory reporting regimes, the variation of accounting quality 
exists in medium companies, whereas for large and small companies, their behaviours are 
quite similar.  
Possible explanations of less variation in accounting quality for large and small 
companies may be that large companies are closely regulated and small companies have little 
opportunities to manage earnings. Medium companies have higher level of accruals and the 
most varied accounting quality. This may be due to medium companies are small enough to 
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